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1 I follow the scenario as told by Lewis.
2 In the sequel of the paper, I assume, as is done in t
propositions are faithfully represented by set of possa b s t r a c t
The aim of this paper is to provide a case for the double-halfer position in the Sleeping
Beauty puzzle. This case relies on the use of the so-called imaging rule for probabilistic
dynamics as a substitute for conditionalization. It is argued that the imaging rule is the
appropriate one for dealing with belief change in Sleeping Beauty and that under natural
assumptions, this rule results in the double-halfer position.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Elga introduced philosophers to the fascinating scenario of Sleeping Beauty [4]. Let me remind you of the scenario. On
Sunday evening ðt0Þ, Sleeping Beauty is put to sleep by an experimental philosopher. She is awakened on Monday morning
and at this moment ðt1Þ, the experimenter does not tell her which day it is. Some time later ðt2Þ, she is told that it is actually
Monday.1 At this point, what follows depends on the toss of a fair coin that took place on Sunday evening and whose outcome
Sleeping Beauty is not aware of. If the coin landed heads ðHEADSÞ, then Sleeping Beauty is put to sleep until the end of the week.
If the coin landed tails ðTAILSÞ, then Sleeping Beauty is awakened on Tuesday morning. The crucial fact is that, in this case, a drug
is given to Sleeping Beauty that makes her forget her previous awakening. As a consequence, the three possible awakenings (viz.
on Monday morning when the coin landed tails, on Monday morning when the coin landed heads and on Tuesday morning
when the coin landed tails) are, by assumption, perfectly indistinguishable from Sleeping Beauty’s point of view. Note that
Sleeping Beauty is informed of each detail of the protocol before the experiment.
The question that has drawn so much attention since [4] is the following: what should be Sleeping Beauty’s degree of belief
that the coin landed heads? Actually, the question may be asked at two different times: at t1 – when Sleeping Beauty is just
awakened on Monday morning – and at t2 – when Sleeping Beauty has been told that it is actually Monday. Let us call the
ﬁrst question Q1 and the second Q2. In the sequel, Piði 2 f0;1;2gÞ will denote Sleeping Beauty’s credence at ti, that is, her
beliefs concerning the relevant propositions.2
Sleeping Beauty is a puzzle about the dynamics of rational beliefs. It is a puzzle because, as we will see in the next section,
intuitive principles and assumptions lead to different answers to questions Qi. And it is not at all clearwhich of these answers
is the right one. The two main answers are the Halfers’ answer on the one hand, and the Thirders’ answer on the other hand.. All rights reserved.
nt d’Etudes Cognitives, 29, rue d’Ulm, F-75005, Paris, France.
he literature, that Sleeping Beauty’s degrees of belief obey the axioms of probability. I assume as well that
ible states in an appropriate state space.
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Beauty’s credence should be such that3 See
4 I do
5 As a
not releP1ðHEADSÞ ¼ P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=2
The double-halfer position is not new3, but, to the best of my knowledge, the reason why I vindicate the double-halfer position
is a new one. Speciﬁcally, my case for it is based on the so-called imaging rule for probabilistic credence change that I propose to
use in the scenario instead of the usual conditioning rule. The imaging rule has up to now received very little attention in philo-
sophical theories of rational belief dynamics. The basic structure of my argument is this one: I will try to argue, ﬁrst, that the
imaging rule should be used by Sleeping Beauty and, second, that if it is used it leads to the double-halfer position.
2. Halfers and thirders
Let’s begin with question Q1: what should be the value of P1ðHEADSÞ? There are basically two camps: the halfers and the
thirders. The thirders claim (following [4]) that P1ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=3 whereas the halfers claim (following [8]) that
P1ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=2. According to the thirders, Sleeping Beauty should decrease her credence in HEADS on her Monday awak-
ening. By contrast, according to the halfers, Sleeping Beauty credence should not change when she is awakened. Now, the
answer to Q1 is closely linked to the answer to Q2 since P2 is the modiﬁcation of P1 after Sleeping Beauty has learnt that
it is actually Monday. As a consequence, the two positions are best described by giving their respective answers to both ques-
tions. Let’s assume that Sleeping Beauty should change her credence by conditionalization; then, one obtains
P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=2 for the thirders and P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ 2=3 for the halfers.
We can therefore sum up the positions of Lewis and Elga as follows:
Let’s turn now to the arguments that are intended to support these two positions. Here, I follow essentially Lewis’ recon-
struction of the disagreement. First, it is supposed that the underlying state space W contains three (so-called centered)
worlds: W ¼ fHM; TM; TTg where
 in HM the coin lands heads and it is Monday,
 in TM the coin lands tails and it is Monday,
 in TT the coin lands tails and it is Tuesday.
W is supposed to be the relevant state space because each state ofW solves all the uncertainties of Sleeping Beauty – both
her temporal location (Monday or Tuesday) and the outcome of the toss (HEADS or TAILS). Some propositions are, according to
Lewis, ‘‘common ground” between him and Elga. Here are the most important4:
(1) P1ðTMÞ ¼ P1ðTTÞ
(2) P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ P1ðHEADSjMondayÞ ¼ P1ðHEADSjfHM; TMgÞ
(3) P0ðHEADSÞ ¼ P0ðTAILSÞ ¼ 1=2
(1) Is a form of the indifference or Laplacean principle reﬂecting the fact that, because of the drug, Sleeping Beauty cannot
distinguish between her Monday awakening and her Tuesday awakening. (2) Says that between t1 and t2, Sleeping Beauty
changes her credence by conditionalization. (3) Reﬂects the fact that, at t0, Sleeping Beauty’s credence obeys to the ‘‘objective
probability” of the coin landing heads or tails.
Elga’s starting point is that the coin could perfectly be tossed after t2, let’s say on Monday evening. If one accepts this,
then, still by endorsement of objective probability, Sleeping Beauty should believe that the probability of HEADS is 1/2 after
she has learned that it is Monday. That is, according to Elga:ðEÞP2ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=2
From (E) and the common ground (including crucially the rule of conditioning expressed by (2)), one has to conclude that
P1ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=3. Elga’s argument is a kind of backward looking argument which starts from an answer to Q2 to give an an-
swer to Q1.
On the other hand, Lewis provides a direct answer to Q1 and infers from it an answer to Q2. Lewis’s premiss is (roughly)5
the following one:for instance [9,3].
not follow Lewis’s numbering.
matter of fact, Lewis’s premiss is that ‘‘only new evidence, centered or uncentered, produces a change in credence; and the evidence [fHM; TM; TTg] is
vant to HEADS versus TAILS.” [8].
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Still, from (L) and the common ground (including crucially the rule of conditioning expressed by (2)), one has to conclude
that P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ 2=3.
A point stressed by Lewis is that both arguments conclude that P1ðHEADSÞ < P2ðHEADSÞ (more precisely,
P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ P1ðHEADSÞ þ 1=6).6 This is a direct consequence of the fact that halfers and thirders are committed to conditional-
ization to shift from P1 to P2. In the current setting, a double-halfer position and, more generally, any position according to which
P1ðHEADSÞ ¼ P2ðHEADSÞ, are excluded: the belief in HEADS is necessarily changed by the information that it is actually Monday.
Both Elga’s and Lewis’s basic intuitions are appealing. Elga’s intuition is that the coin could be tossed on Monday night
and that in this case, one should endorse the objective probability of HEADS as her credence. Lewis’s intuition is that on Mon-
day morning, there is no new evidence that is relevant to the credence concerning HEADS. Therefore the credence toward
HEADS at t1 should remain the same as at t0. What is clear from the remarks above is that, given the common ground between
Elga and Lewis, these intuitions cannot be reconciled. As a consequence, someone who ﬁnds both intuitions appealing (and
accordingly who accepts both (E) and (L)) faces the following dilemma: either to give up one of the intuitions, or to give
up part of the common ground.
3. Conditioning and imaging
I will question neither the underlying state space W, nor propositions (1) and (3) but rather proposition (2), namely the
use of conditionalization to shift from P1 to P2.
Let’s note ﬁrstly that what is learned at t2 by Sleeping Beauty (‘‘it is Monday”) is a context-sensitive piece of information: a
proposition whose truth-value depends on the context, and more precisely on the temporal features of the context. Impor-
tantly, context-sensitive propositions are in general problematic for conditionalization. To be more precise, there are two
central properties of conditionalization that are problematic: concentration and partiality.
(i) Concentration is the fact that the beliefs of an agent who conditionalizes become more and more concentrated as she
learns more and more information. Let’s make this property more precise. A piece of information I is said to be non-
trivial iff it excludes at least one world in the support of the initial probability distribution PðI \ SuppðPÞ–;Þ; and com-
patible with the initial probability iff its intersection with the support of the initial probability is not empty
ðI \ SuppðPÞ–;Þ. Concentration is the fact that each time a non-trivial information I compatible with the initial prob-
ability P is learnt, the support of the posterior probability distribution PI is strictly included in the support of the initial
probability ðSuppðPIÞ  SuppðPÞÞ. Since the probabilities of the worlds still sum to 1, this means that each of the worlds
of SuppðPÞ that is compatible with the information I has more weight after conditionalization on I. The concentration
property implies the so-called preservation property [5], namely that if a proposition A is believed with certainty, then
after having learned any information compatible with the initial beliefs, A is still believed with certainty. In a time-
sensitive context, this means, for instance, that if an agent is certain that it is Monday, she cannot not afterwards
(i.e. on Tuesday) lose her certainty. Concentration implies as well that if a proposition has null probability, its prob-
ability will remain null whatever information compatible with the initial probability is learnt. This means that if an
agent is certain that it is not Monday, she cannot lose this certainty.
(ii) Partiality is the fact that when a piece of information is incompatible with the agent’s initial beliefs, the new proba-
bility distribution is undeﬁned. With time-sensitive propositions, this is clearly problematic: if an agent believes, for
instance, that it is Sunday and some time later learns that now it is Monday, conditionalization is not capable of deal-
ing with this piece of information.
These two issues are admittedly quite general, but they give us prima facie reasons to look more carefully at the use of
conditionalization in Sleeping Beauty’s scenario.7 Conditionalization is often viewed as the only reasonable rule for changing
one’s credence8. Other rules are conceivable, however. The most famous alternative rule is the imaging rule introduced by [7] as
the rule that matches Stalnaker’s conditional. The basic idea of the imaging rule is this. For each worldw and each proposition A,
let be wA the closest world to w where A is true.9 Suppose that the agent is informed that A holds. In the case of conditional-
ization, all the weights of the A-worlds are allocated to A-worlds compatible with the prior in a way that preserves the relative
probabilities. In the case of imaging, the weight of a A-world w is exclusively allocated to the world wA. The rule of imaging is
therefore the following:PImðAÞðwÞ ¼
X
w02W :w¼w0
Af g
Pðw0Þs point is important for Lewis’s argument since, from his point of view, it supports the rejection of proposition (E). According to Lewis, this is an
on that the current context is not one where Sleeping Beauty should endorse objective probability after she has learnt that it is Monday.
detailed discussions, see [2,9].
diachronic Dutch Book argument is the main justiﬁcation for this belief. See [10].
e sure, it is not an assumption that is kept in Lewis’s own semantics of conditionals. Lewis factorizes this assumption into the limit assumption and the
ess assumption, and rejects both.
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after imaging on A is the sum of the probabilities of the worlds w0 such that w is the closest world to w0 where A is true. As
stressed by Lewis, imaging satisﬁes a form of minimality: there is ‘‘no gratuitous movement of probability from worlds to dis-
similar worlds” [7]. Here is an example that is intended to illustrate the divergent behavior of conditionalization and imaging:
Example 1 (Apple and Banana, partial beliefs). A basket may contain an apple and a banana, only one of the two fruits or no
fruits at all. There are therefore four possible states: fAB;A:B;:AB;:A:Bg:AB10 It is easy to checkA:B
:AB :A:BSuppose then that the initial probability, P, is such that the agent is certain that there is at least one fruit in the basket and
that the same weight is allocated to the remaining states:1/3 1/3
1/3 0The agent receives the following information: I ¼ fA:B;:A:Bg, that is, there is no banana in the basket. If the agent relies
on conditionalization, her new belief should be this:0 1
0 0But if the agent relies on imaging with ABI ¼ A:B and :ABI ¼ :A:B, one obtains this:0 2/3
0 1/3This example shows that the use of conditionalization and the use of imaging on the very same information may lead to
different probabilities. Two remarks are in order. Firstly, note that the property of concentration is violated by the imaging
rule: the world :A:B is not in the support of P but is nonetheless in the support of PImðIÞ. This is a characteristic feature of the
imaging rule that requires an interpretation of it that differs from the one that is tacitly associated to conditionalization. We
will come back on this point in Section 5. Secondly, this example is not intended to support the use of imaging but only to
illustrate the difference between the two rules. (From our point of view, it is admittedly a scenario where the conditional-
ization rule seems to be the right one.) We will see in Sections 4 and 5 in which contexts the imaging rule could be appro-
priately used. For the moment, let’s assume that the imaging rule acts as an alternative to conditionalization in Sleeping
Beauty’s scenario and see what changes are induced.4. Imaging and Sleeping Beauty
As one would expect, the debate between halfers and thirders is dramatically transformed if one adopts a rule of belief
change that is different from conditionalization. To apply the imaging rule, one needs ﬁrst to make some assumption on the
similarity between worlds. In the case of Sleeping Beauty, the information that Sleeping Beauty learns at t2 (‘‘it is Monday”)
excludes one world from P1’s support, namely the world TT (‘‘the coin lands tails and it is Tuesday”). Therefore, the only
parameter that has to be speciﬁed is the closest world to TT where it is true that it is Monday. I think it is a rather natural
assumption to suppose that TM (‘‘the coin lands tails and it is Monday”) is the closest world to TT where it is true that it is
Monday. Granting this assumption, the imaging rule is easily applied to Sleeping Beauty’s scenario.
As I said before, I consider both Elga and Lewis’s basic intuitions as attractive. Let’s start from Lewis’s premiss (L) and the
remaining of the common ground (propositions (1) and (3)). If one relies on imaging, thenP2ðTMÞ ¼ PImðMondayÞ1 ðTMÞ ¼ P1ðTMÞ þ P1ðTTÞ ¼ 1=2; and
P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ P2ðHMÞ ¼ PImðMondayÞ1 ðHMÞ ¼ P1ðHMÞ ¼ 1=2:In other words, from Lewis’s premiss (L), one is lead to a double-halfer position: the credence of Sleeping Beauty toward
HEADS is the same at t1 and t2, namely 1/2. But we could start from Elga’s intuitions as well and suppose thatthat PImðAÞ is indeed a probability distribution.
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ization in Elga’s original argument, one obtains P1ðHEADSÞ ¼ P2ðHEADSÞ ¼ 1=2.
What this shows is that if one starts either from Elga’s or from Lewis’s basic intuition and that one relies on the imaging
rule rather than on conditionalization, then one obtains the double-halfer position. But what this does not show is that one
should rely on imaging rather than on conditionalization. At this point, the crucial issue is to adjudicate between several rules
of belief change. The remaining of the paper is precisely devoted to the justiﬁcation of the use of the imaging rule.
5. Revising and updating
In order to justify the imaging rule, I will make a small detour through models of full beliefs. For more than two decades,
formal epistemology has developed rules of full belief change. The main model for full beliefs change is well-known: it is the
so-called AGM model [1]. It has been convincingly argued by [6] that one should carefully distinguish two kinds of belief
change contexts: contexts of revisingwhere the agent learns information about an environment that is supposed to be stable
and contexts of updating where the agent learns information about a (potential) change in her environment. If, for instance,
the agent has beliefs concerning the content of a basket of fruits that may or may not contain an apple and that may or may
not contain a banana, a revising information could be that there is no banana in the basket and an updating information
could be that there is no more banana in the basket (if there was any). In the ﬁrst case, it is supposed that the environment
has not changed between the initial moment (say t1) and the moment where information is delivered (say t2). In the second
case, it is assumed that the information bears on an event that may have occurred between t1 and t2.
The point is that rules of belief change have to be different in these two kinds of contexts: the logic of updating and the
logic of revising are not the same. Intuitively, in a revising context, a non-trivial piece of information tells us that some of the
worlds considered at t1 could not be the actual world at t1 whereas in an updating context, a non-trivial piece of information
does not tell anything about the actual world at t1: it reports a change that has affected the actual world (whathever it is)
since t1. As a consequence, it seems plausible in an updating context to require, as say Katsuno and Mendelzon, that ‘‘each of
the old possible worlds [are given] equal consideration”. This requirement may be captured by an axiom whose content is
roughly that the updating of ðK [ K 0Þ by I should be equal to the union of the updating of K by I and the updating of K 0 by I.
And this axiom is not compatible with standards principles of revising. One of the major resulting differences is the following
one. Suppose that the agent’s full beliefs are represented by a belief set, that is, a subset of the state space (the set of states
that are compatible with agent’s beliefs). In a revising context, given information that is compatible with the initial belief
set11, the new belief set has to be included in the initial belief set12 whereas in an updating context, the new belief may not
be included in the initial belief set13. This results in two kinds of rationality postulates: the so-called AGM-postulates for belief
revision [5] and the KM-postulates [6] for belief updating.14 This is illustrated by the following example:
Example 2 (Apple and banana, full beliefs). A basket may contain an apple and a banana, only one of the two fruits or no fruits
at all. There are therefore four possible states: fAB;A:B;:AB;:A:Bg: Suppose the agent believes initially that there is at least
one fruit in the basket i.e. K ¼ fAB;A:B;:ABg:AB11 The notion of com
12 In the same way th
is compatible with the
13 In the same way t
information is compati
14 It is not the place
15 Of course, a revisin
set – which is the caseA:B
:ABA revising message would deliver information to the agent concerning the initial state of the basket of fruits. This message
could be, for instance, that there is no banana in the basket. The new belief set will be: Kr ¼ K \ fA:B;:A:Bg ¼ fA:Bg15.
But suppose the agent is informed that something has happened (maybe Bob, who is a compulsive banana eater, saw the
basket) such that if there was a banana in the basket, it is no more in it. In this case, it is much more intuitive to reason in the
following way: if the true world was AB, then it is now A:B; if it was A:B, it is unchanged; and if it was :AB, then it is now
:A:B. Therefore one would obtain as a new belief set Ku ¼ fA:B;:A:Bg which differs from Kr . To sum up:Revising Updating
‘‘there is no
banana”
‘‘there is no more banana (if there was any)”A:B A:B
:A:Bpatibility is analogous to the probabilistic one deﬁned above: information I is compatible with the belief set K iff I \ K–;.
at, after conditionalization, the support of the new probability distribution is included in the support of the initial one, if the information
latter. Note that if, furthermore, the information is non-trivial, one obtains precisely the property of concentration.
hat, after imaging, the support of the new probability distribution may not be included in the support of the initial one, even if the
ble with the latter.
to enter into the formal details. One can ﬁnd an uniﬁed exposition of both systems of postulates in [11].
g belief change is not reducible to the operation of intersection. It is the case only if the information is compatible with the initial belief
in our example.
So much for the distinction between updating and revising. The Sleeping Beauty scenario is probabilistic and involves
rules of partial belief change. A natural question would then be the following: if one accepts the distinction between revising
and updating contexts (as I do), what are the corresponding rules of partial belief change?
The question was left unanswered until recently. But [11] have shown the following results, which are at the very core of
my argument: (a) conditionalization-like change rules may be derived from probabilistic transcription of AGM-postulates for
belief revision whereas (b) imaging-like change rules may be derived from probabilistic transcription of KM-postulates.
These results may be interpreted in the following way: if one is guided by rationality postulates of full belief change, then,
in a revising context one should rely on conditionalization whereas in an updating context one should rely on imaging.
To sum up my argument up to this point: in the previous section, I have argued that if one starts either from Elga’s or
Lewis’s basic intuitions and that one relies on imaging, then one obtains the double-halfer position. In the current section,
I have argued that if the context of belief change is an updating context, then one should rely on imaging. For the argument to
be complete, it remains therefore to be argued that when Sleeping Beauty learns that it is Monday (at t2), it is indeed an
updating context, and not a context of revising.
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An updating context (of belief change) is a context where an agent is informed about a potential16 change of her situation.
Now, in so far as in Sleeping Beauty’s scenario we consider centered worlds, information bearing on a change of temporal loca-
tion is information about a change of Sleeping Beauty’s situation. And it is precisely this information that the experimenter pro-
vides to Sleeping Beauty at t2. Therefore, it seems that this is an updating context. If one admits the conclusions of the preceding
sections, one is therefore led to the double-halfer position.
But if one looks more carefully at the exact timing of information in the Sleeping Beauty scenario, things are much less
clear than they appear to be. As a matter of fact, when Sleeping Beauty becomes aware at t1 (at her awakening on Monday)
that she is on Monday or Tuesday (and no longer on Sunday), this is a true updating context since the day it is then (t1 or t2) is
different from the day it was at t0. But when she learns that is it Monday (at t2), the information does not bear on a change
that took place between t1 and t2. At t1, Sleeping Beauty becomes aware that the actual (centered) world is among
I1 ¼ fHM; TM; TTg. At t2, the information that is given to her allows her to reﬁne her beliefs since she learns
I2 ¼ fHM; TMg. From this point of view, the information provided at t2 seems to be a revising context. On the other hand,
I2 is a reﬁnement of an updating-type piece of information, namely I1. This issue shows that the distinction between updat-
ing and revising contexts is underspeciﬁed and raises quite a general question: when an agent learns successively two pieces
of information at t1 and t2, which both bear on a change that took place between t0 and t1, should we view the second piece
of information as a revising or as an updating context? This issue is crucial for the double-halfer position: if the piece of infor-
mation that is provided to Sleeping Beauty at t2 has to be considered as a revising context, then our case for double-halfers
collapses.
I am not in a position to provide a general answer to this difﬁcult question: updating alone, iteration of belief change and
a fortiori hybrid belief change that mixes updating and revising are all poorly understood17. Nonetheless, I will exhibit an
example with a similar structure, in particular where the agent receives two pieces of information at two different times,
and where it is more intuitive to handle the second piece of information by updating.
Example 3 (Apple, banana and coconut). A basket may contain three fruits: an apple, a banana and a coconut. There are eight
possible worlds:ABC16 The qualiﬁcation h
17 I initially underes
version of the argume:ABCas to be stressed. If Bob
timated the difﬁculties r
nt above.A:BC, the banana eater, sees
aised by these issues. I a:A:BC
AB:C :AB:C A:B:C :A:B:CSuppose ﬁrst that the agent’s initial beliefs can be represented by the following probability distribution P0:1/2 0 0 0
1/2 0 0 0In other words, the agent is certain that there is an apple and a banana in the basket, but does not knowwhether there is a
coconut. Suppose that the agent is told that between t0 and t1, either the apple or the banana (but not both) has been
removed (information I1). She could then update her beliefs by relying on a generalized form of imaging that allows ties
between ‘‘closest worlds”: she allocates equally the weight of world ABC to the worlds :ABC and A:BC. On the other hand,the basket of fruits and there is no banana inside, there will be no change.
m indebted to an anonymous referee who showed me how they were affecting a ﬁrst
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stage, it is not possible to have neither banana nor coconut.18 The resulting belief state at t1 is therefore given by P1:018 This is of course s1/4traightforwardly remini1/4scent of the asymmetry0
0 1/2 0 0Now suppose that at t2 a new information is given about what happens between t0 and t1: actually, an apple and not a
banana was removed (information I2). Let’s compare the results of imaging and conditionalization. P
CondðI2Þ
1 is obvious:0 1/3 0 0
0 2/3 0 0To compute PImðI2Þ1 we need an assumption on the closest world similar to A:BC where :AB is true. A natural one it that
this world is nothing but :ABC. In this case, PImðI2Þ1 is given by0 1/2 0 0
0 1/2 0 0What lesson can we draw from this example? If someone is convinced that for an updating message it is appropriate to
use an update rule, then PImðI2Þ1 is much more intuitive than P
CondðI2Þ
1 . Apple, banana and coconut bears some similarity with
Sleeping Beauty: (a) the relevant change in the world takes place between t0 and t1; (b) what the agent learns at t1 and t2
bears on the change in the world that has taken place between t0 and t1; and (c) the second information is a reﬁnement of the
ﬁrst ðI2  I1Þ. As a consequence, the example provides some support to the basic claim of the present section, namely that the
information received by Sleeping Beauty at t2 should be viewed as an updating context.7. Conclusion
Imaging provides a way to support the double-halfer position, which may be viewed as a reconciliation of Elga and Lewis.
Note that the use of the imaging rule in the Sleeping Beauty scenario rests on the same fundamental assumption as the one
that underlies both Elga’s and Lewis’ arguments, namely that information about one’s temporal location has to be treated in
the same way as any other kind of information. To rigorously assess this assumption, one would need to make explicit the
structural role of temporal factors in rules of belief change but this, I leave for future investigation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank for their comments J. Baratgin, D. Bonnay, T. Daniels, I. Drouet, P. Egré, Th. Martin, B. Walliser,
D. Zwirn and audiences from ‘‘Probability, Decision, Uncertainty” (IHPST, Paris), ‘‘Paris-Amsterdam Logic Meeting for Young
Researchers” (ILLC, Amsterdam), the ‘‘Seminar on Belief Dynamics” (Dept. of Philosophy, Lille) and TARK 2007 (Brussels). This
research was supported by a post-doctoral fellowship of the Région Ile-de-France.
References
[1] C. Alchourron, P. Gärdenfors, D. Makinson, On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions, Journal of Symbolic Logic 50
(1985) 510–530.
[2] F. Arntzenius, Some problems for conditionalization and reﬂection, Journal of Philosophy 100 (7) (2003) 356–371.
[3] N. Bostrom, Sleeping Beauty and self-location: a hybrid model, Synthese 157 (1) (2007) 59–78.
[4] A. Elga, Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem, Analysis 60 (2) (2000) 143–147.
[5] P. Gärdenfors, Knowledge in Flux Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1988.
[6] A. Katsuno, A. Mendelzon, On the difference between updating a knowledge base and revising it, in: P. Gärdenfors (Ed.), Belief Revision, Cambridge UP,
Cambridge, 1992, pp. 183–203.
[7] D. Lewis, Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities, The Philosophical Review LXXXV (3) (1976) 297–315.
[8] D. Lewis, Sleeping Beauty: a reply to Elga, Analysis 61 (2001) 171–176.
[9] C. Meacham, Sleeping Beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs, 2005. <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002526/>.
[10] P. Teller, Conditionalization and observation, Synthese 26 (2) (1973) 218–258.
[11] B. Walliser, D. Zwirn, ‘Can bayes’ rule be justiﬁed by cognitive rationality principles, Theory and Decision, vol. 53, 2002.between Monday and Tuesday in Sleeping Beauty.
